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LEAVING DISESTABLISHMENT TO 
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
CHRISTOPHER C. LUND 
INTRODUCTION 
Last term, the Supreme Court decided Greece v. Galloway,1 a case 
about prayer at town meetings. The Court upheld the prayer scheme, 
which is what most expected. There were no big surprises, no sea 
change in the law. The Supreme Court made it somewhat more 
difficult for plaintiffs to challenge legislative prayers, though the door 
remains open, if just a crack. 
If Galloway is important, it is not for what it holds but for what it 
signals about the future of the Establishment Clause. Academics are 
prone to overreading cases—seeing portentous omens where others 
see only dirty tea leaves. But let me play the role of provocateur. Let 
me suggest that Galloway does have a message and that message is 
this: The Establishment Clause is pretty much done. 
This sounds annoyingly overwrought, so let me clarify a bit. It is 
not that the Establishment Clause no longer means anything—or 
even that the Roberts Court will cut the Establishment Clause back 
significantly.2 Despite repeated invitations and concrete opportunities, 
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Weinberg for helpful comments. This piece draws from a Slate column I wrote in advance of 
oral argument in Galloway, see infra note 25, and from a SCOTUSblog post I wrote after the 
Court’s decision, see Christopher Lund, Symposium: Town of Greece v. Galloway Going 
Forward, SCOTUSBLOG (May 6, 2014, 5:05PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/05/ 
symposium-town-of-greece-v-galloway-going-forward/. For disclosure’s sake, I should add that I 
wrote an amicus brief for a group of constitutional law professors arguing that the Court should 
overrule Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), a position that attracted no votes. See Brief of 
Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 
S Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5461834. 
 1.  134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
 2.  Contra, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 
49 (2007) (“If the assumptions outlined here about the new majority of the Roberts Court are 
correct, we are about to witness a paradigm shift in the way the Supreme Court approaches the 
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the Court has refused to make sweeping changes to the Establishment 
Clause. Of course, the future will surely see changes. Now that Justice 
Kennedy has replaced Justice O’Connor as the swing vote, the Court 
will probably be more accepting of government-sponsored religious 
symbols and evenhanded funding of religious institutions.3 But the 
middle of the Court seems profoundly uninterested in a general 
rollback of the Establishment Clause. The bar on government-
sponsored religion in public schools will remain more-or-less absolute. 
And outside public schools, the Court will continue to restrict 
government-sponsored religion to a few discrete areas and regulate it 
pretty heavily within those areas. The Establishment Clause is safe, at 
least for the most part. So when I suggest that the Establishment 
Clause is pretty much done, I mean something different. 
I 
The Establishment Clause is a constitutional provision with a 
teleology. Its natural ambition, its built-in goal, is the end we 
conveniently call disestablishment—the abolition of all the religious 
preferences associated with the old established churches of Western 
Europe.4 But disestablishment is more of a process than an object. 
Disestablishment did not happen in 1689 with Locke’s Letter 
Concerning Toleration;5 it did not happen in 1789 with the passage of 
the First Amendment; it did not happen in 1833 when Massachusetts 
abandoned the final vestiges of its formally established church; it did 
not happen in 1868 with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment; it 
did not happen in 1947 with Everson,6 or in 1962 with Engel.7 Those 
 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”). 
 3.  Most vulnerable are (1) the restraints on direct funding imposed by Mitchell v. Helms, 
530 U.S. 793 (2000), where Justice Kennedy did not join Justice O’Connor’s limiting 
concurrence, and (2) the restraints on religious symbols established in McCreary County v. 
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005), which were supported by Justice O’Connor but not by Justice 
Kennedy. 
 4.  This statement is not uncontroversial; it requires a defense against those who would 
argue that the Establishment Clause is neutral on disestablishment, in the sense that it left intact 
establishments of religion created by state governments. See STEVE D. SMITH, THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 49–62 (2014); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 
693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). It is true, of course, that the Establishment Clause left state 
establishments alone, but that is not at all the same as being neutral on disestablishment. For a 
longer explanation of this point, see Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of 
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 155, 241–43 (2004). 
 5.  JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Hacket Publishing Co. 1983) 
(1689). 
 6.  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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things advanced the cause of disestablishment but did not accomplish 
it. For there were many elements to an established church, and those 
elements had to be removed one by one.8 Disestablishment has taken 
centuries. But it would be better to say that disestablishment is taking 
centuries. We are not done yet. 
The principal driver of disestablishment has always been religious 
diversity. As religious diversity grows, so too does the thirst for 
disestablishment. As the range of religious disagreement expands, 
things formerly agreed upon lose their consensus. The Elizabethan 
Settlement saw the Anglican Church try, sometimes genuinely, to 
tolerate within itself the entire range of then-existing religious 
opinion. But the Puritans in seventeenth-century England were just 
too disagreeable, as were the Baptists and Presbyterians in 
eighteenth-century Virginia. The battles they engendered brought the 
most obvious and restrictive features of the classic establishments—
tax support and mandatory attendance—to a close. 
This still held out the possibility of a pan-Protestant alliance, 
organized around the government still being able to teach religious 
truth; the early-19th-century public schools taught a watered-down 
kind of generic Protestantism that had wide-ranging appeal. But 
newly arriving Catholic immigrants struggled against this, and the 
resulting controversies dashed hopes that government could instill 
Christianity without controversy. And this century has brought our 
country only further down this road. Increasing religious diversity has 
frustrated every attempt to close ranks. Even if Protestants and 
Catholics could agree on daily school readings from the New 
Testament, what about Jews? Even if all of them could agree on Ten 
Commandments displays, what about Hindus, Buddhists, and 
nonbelievers? 
For most of American history, the Supreme Court had no role in 
any of these developments. The Court did not regularly start hearing 
 
 7.  Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 8.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, 
Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131–81 (2003) (noting the 
central elements of the established Anglican church in England were (1) government control 
over the doctrines, structure, and personnel of the state church; (2) mandatory attendance at the 
religious worship services of the state church; (3) public financial support of the state church; (4) 
prohibition of religious worship in other denominations; (5) the use of the state church for civil 
functions, such as marriage; and (6) the limitation of political participation to members of the 
state church). 
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Establishment Clause cases until 1947.9 But over the past seventy 
years, the Court has become the principal expositor and enforcer of 
the Establishment Clause. And while there have been periods of 
decline and periods of vacillation, the long arc of judicial intervention 
has bent toward greater and greater disestablishment. 
And at least for some, this gave rise to a set of largely unstated 
expectations. The Court might resist temporarily, but 
disestablishment’s natural gravity would ultimately prove inexorable. 
The Court would bring the Establishment Clause to its completion; it 
would write the final chapter of disestablishment. It would overrule 
the decisions allowing holiday displays and Ten Commandments 
displays; it would invalidate the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance and maybe even “In God We Trust” on the currency; it 
would overrule its decision sanctioning legislative prayer. This might 
take decades; it might take more. And last of all the cases to be 
overruled would be the Court’s 1961 decision in McGowan v. 
Maryland,10 the Sunday-closing-law case. Five centuries after Luther 
and three centuries after Locke, Pennsylvanians would finally be free 
to hunt on Sundays.11 
But that is not the future of the Establishment Clause. We do not 
know what that future will be exactly, but it will not be that. A bit 
depends, of course, on the future composition of the Court. But even 
deep changes in the Court’s personnel will not change the basic point. 
Thirty years ago, there were three votes to overrule Marsh v. 
Chambers.12 Now there are none.13 Strict separationists have always 
had trouble counting to five; now we have trouble counting to one. 
The meaning of old cases will change and new developments will 
generate new cases. But there is a feeling now unlike before—a 
feeling that we stand at the end of the Establishment Clause. The 
Court will not take us much further along this path. Perhaps, oddly 
enough, this too is a consequence of America’s increasing religious 
 
 9.  See supra text accompanying note 6 (citing Everson). 
 10.  366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
 11.  See Hunters United for Sunday Hunting v. Pa. Game Comm’n, 28 F. Supp. 3d 340, 340 
(M.D. Pa. 2014) (upholding, under Establishment Clause challenge, Section 2303(a) of the 
Pennsylvania Game and Wildlife Code, which makes it “unlawful for any person to hunt for any 
furbearer or game on Sunday”). 
 12.  463 U.S. 783, 795–822 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.); id. at 
822–24 (Stevens., J., dissenting). 
 13.  See infra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kagan’s agreement with 
Marsh). 
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pluralism. Perhaps the Court thinks nonbelievers are now sufficiently 
numerous and powerful to protect themselves. There is truth to that. 
But there is another side too—America is religiously heterogeneous 
at the national level, but is often quite homogenous at the local level. 
There are dangers with leaving disestablishment to the political 
process. 
II 
To understand Galloway, it helps to begin not with its facts but 
with the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Marsh v. Chambers.14 
Marsh involved a challenge to Nebraska’s practice of having a 
permanent chaplain open legislative sessions with prayer.15 The 
challenge was not far-fetched. The Court had interpreted the 
Establishment Clause to prohibit government from favoring religion 
for decades, and legislative chaplaincies seemed a clear violation of 
that principle.16 But in a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court 
upheld Nebraska’s practice, making a small but important exception 
to its stated rule of religious neutrality. This exception, the Court 
explained, was just so clearly implied by history.17 The First Congress 
approved the Establishment Clause, but it also hired chaplains.18 
While Marsh accepted legislative prayer, it also suggested limits. 
In one part of the opinion, the Court said that legislative prayer could 
not be “exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage 
any other, faith or belief.”19 In another, the Court approvingly noted 
how Nebraska’s chaplain had stopped using specifically Christian 
language in his prayers after a complaint.20 So Marsh seemed to 
impose a limit on prayers—they could not be too denominational—
but the Court never explained exactly where the line should be 
drawn. 
In the thirty years after Marsh, lower courts looked for that line in 
a variety of cases presenting all kinds of facts. Galloway turned out to 
be the one the Supreme Court took. Not all the facts in Galloway 
 
 14.  463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 15.  Id. at 784. 
 16.  Id. at 796–98 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 17.  Id. at 786 (majority opinion). 
 18.  For an extended look at Marsh and for detail on these points, see Christopher C. Lund, 
Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 980–90 
(2010). 
 19.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95. 
 20.  Id. at 793 n.14. 
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were agreed upon, but the general outline is clear. Located in upstate 
New York, the Town of Greece began inviting local clergy to offer 
prayers before meetings starting in 1999.21 Until 2007, all the clergy 
were Christian ministers and their prayers frequently referred to 
Jesus Christ and frequently encouraged the audience to join in.22 After 
complaints, the prayer-givers became more diverse—a Wiccan 
priestess gave a prayer, as did the head of a Bah’ai congregation and a 
Jewish layperson.23 The Town even said that atheists and agnostics 
could sign up to give invocations, though it did not publicize that 
fact.24 But the vast majority of prayers involved Christian language. 
And after 2009, for reasons that are not entirely clear, only Christian 
clergy were involved in offering prayers.25 
Both sides brought straightforward arguments. The plaintiffs saw 
this arrangement as overly coercive and unduly sectarian. The Town 
was not just supporting religion in general but Christianity in 
particular, and attendees were forced either into praying or appearing 
to pray.26 The Town said this was unfortunate but inevitable. In a town 
made up mostly of Christians, most prayers inevitably would be 
Christian, unless the government started acting as a kind of censor.27 
Earlier work of mine has stressed how both sides are 
fundamentally right, and how legislative prayer ends up being a kind 
of zero-sum game for religious liberty.28 Listeners deserve to be 
protected from their government making religious statements with 
which they disagree. But protecting them requires speakers to change 
the ways they pray. It is a classic catch-22, rooted in a simple 
undeniable fact: We live in a world where people have different 
religious beliefs. Some do not pray. And those who do pray do so in 
different ways; they pray to Gods that they do not see as the same 
God. In that world, there is no way for the government to pray in a 
way that satisfies everyone. This has always been a central problem 
with the government practicing religion: Whose religion will it 
 
 21.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1816 (2014). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 1817. 
 24.  Id. at 1816. 
 25.  The Court explores the facts in Galloway. Id. at 1816–18. Additional details can be 
found in Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer Goes Back to the Supreme Court, SLATE, Aug. 
15, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/08/the_supreme_ 
court_will_have_another_chance_to_decide_when_government_can.html.  
 26.  Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 at 1819–20. 
 27.  Id. at 1814, 1817. 
 28.  See Lund, supra note 18, at 1029–30. 
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practice? 
This has led to some difficult choices for local governments who 
choose to have legislative prayer. Recent history provides cases of 
excluded speakers, alienated listeners, interrupting protestors 
(sometimes sent to prison), censorship and editorial control, inflamed 
citizenry, retaliation, and political spillover.29 In one under-the-radar 
example that developed at the same time as Galloway, a referendum 
put it to the voters to decide whether the City Council should 
continue its policy allowing prayers mentioning Jesus Christ. Twelve 
thousand votes were cast—76 percent in favor of allowing references 
to Christ, 24 percent opposed.30 Maybe we accept these kinds of 
developments as inevitable consequences of legislative prayer’s 
sometimes positive role in the history of this country, but these are 
some uncomfortable things we have to accept. 
III 
Galloway is not a terribly surprising decision. Most expected the 
Court to uphold the prayer scheme. The Second Circuit’s judgment 
seemed vulnerable from the moment it was issued. The die was 
probably cast when certiorari was granted, or at least when the 
Obama Administration entered the case on the Town’s side. 
And Galloway is not terribly groundbreaking either. The Court 
makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to challenge legislative prayer 
schemes, but it works strenuously to limit the consequences of its 
decision. Justice Kennedy writes the majority opinion for five Justices. 
He concludes that the prayers are constitutional, because they are 
neither overly sectarian nor overly coercive.31 It is enough that the 
Town opened the prayer opportunity up to all denominations, and 
allowed anyone to say anything. It does not matter that prayers ended 
up overwhelmingly Christian—that was not the Town’s fault. It does 
not matter that attendees may have felt pressured to join the 
prayers—they had no objective reason to feel pressured. This holding 
is not shocking. It is, in fact, pretty much what the Obama 
 
 29.  These examples are discussed in Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 18–24, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 
WL 5461834 at *18–24; and Lund, supra note 18, at 1039–49 (2010). 
 30.  See Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 802 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (upholding 
the policy and practice), aff'd, 710 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2013). But see W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“[F]undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they 
depend on the outcome of no elections.”). 
 31.  Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1828. 
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Administration had urged, and what some lower courts had held 
before Galloway. 
Now the Court leaves the door open. The Justices repeatedly 
caution that some prayer schemes might cross the constitutional line. 
But the Court clearly means to make it more difficult to bring these 
cases. Marsh had said that legislative prayers could not “proselytize or 
advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”32 Consider 
the differences between that and the majority opinion in Galloway: 
“[T]he course and practice over time [must show] that the invocations 
denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten damnation, or 
preach conversion.”33 Notice the subtle changes there—the addition 
of the phrases “course and practice” and “over time,” the use of words 
like “denigration” instead of “disparagement,” “damnation” instead of 
“advancement,” “preaching conversion” instead of “proselytizing.” 
While the Court is clear about its desire to raise the bar, it is 
profoundly unclear on where exactly it means to set it. The Court 
offers a multitude of vague and slightly inconsistent phrases. As per 
above, the Court condemns invocation practices that “denigrate 
nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach 
conversion.”34 But at another point, the Court says that the issue is 
whether there is “a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, 
proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose.”35 Is 
there a difference there? Later on, the Court says there would also be 
a problem “if town board members directed the public to participate 
in the prayers, singled out dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that 
their decisions might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the 
prayer opportunity.”36 But then, sentences later, the Court rephrases 
the same concerns in a slightly different way, asking whether the 
government “allocated benefits and burdens based on participation in 
the prayer,” “received [citizens] differently depending on whether 
they joined the invocation,” “signal[ed] disfavor toward 
nonparticipants,” or “suggest[ed] that their stature in the community 
was in any way diminished” by not participating.37 There certainly is a 
common core here, but it’s not clear which of the things (if any) is 
 
 32.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983). 
 33.  Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1823. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 1824. 
 36.  Id. at 1826. 
 37.  Id. 
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supposed to be the touchstone. All the Court will say is that each is a 
“fact-sensitive” inquiry.38 
The predictable result is that no one has any idea where the line is. 
And this may be an intended result too. The Court wants to set the 
bar high enough to discourage plaintiffs from bringing these suits, but 
the absence of any bar whatsoever would only encourage abuses by 
defendants. When the goal is to paralyze both sides, it is best to have 
an unclear test. The Court knows this from experience. This is 
precisely what the Court did in its cases about holiday displays and 
Ten Commandments monuments.39 
One intriguing aspect to the decision is the way the Court handles 
the issue of state action. The best single fact for the Town—a fact that 
they smartly stressed at every critical juncture—was how prayer-
givers were selected. It looked almost like a public forum. The Town 
did not pick and choose among clergy, so the fact that the prayers 
happened to be overwhelmingly Christian came as a natural 
consequence of the Town’s religious demographics. Preventing overly 
denominational prayers, the Town stressed, would mean either 
manipulating the clergy-selection process or censoring prayers. 
The claim of censorship takes beautiful advantage of the blur that 
sometimes exists between private and state action. At bottom, no one 
really doubts that Greece is responsible for these prayers. (That is, of 
course, why the Establishment Clause applies here in the first place.) 
So there is state action. But the state action is quite dim; the prayers 
have private aspects too. This both gives respectability to the claim of 
censorship and muddies the waters conceptually. The Town is involved 
enough that ordinary folks attending meetings will know that the 
government stands behind these prayers, but the Town stays out of it 
enough to provide plausible deniability of that fact. 
This sounds like a novel feature of Galloway, but it is actually a 
recurring feature of modern Establishment Clause cases. Think of the 
cross in Salazar v. Buono,40 which was on government property but 
had been erected by (and later was transferred to) private parties; 
 
 38.  Id. at 1825 (“The inquiry remains a fact-sensitive one that considers both the setting in 
which the prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed.”). 
 39.  Ten years ago, the Court decided two cases involving Ten Commandments displays, 
upholding one and striking down the other. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 
(2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). Twenty years earlier, the Court was similarly 
divided in two cases involving holiday displays. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 
(1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 40.  559 U.S. 700 (2010). 
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think of the student election in Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe,41 or the invited rabbi in Lee v. Weisman.42 Government masks its 
role enough that courts instinctively think of the religious activity as 
private and any interference as entanglement and censorship. But out 
of court, government can let the mask drop. One sees this in Galloway 
itself. The Court is obviously troubled by the censorial implications of 
the plaintiff’s argument.43 But now that state and local governments 
have their holding on the Establishment Clause issue, they can freely 
go back to policies where the state action is more pronounced. Now 
largely freed of content restrictions, local officials can simply pray 
themselves and forget about inviting in outside clergy or residents. 
This may be happening already.44 
Another striking part of Galloway is the Court’s rhetoric. There is 
a bit of irony here. Over the years, when the left was winning these 
cases, liberal Justices would be attacked by conservatives for being far 
too confident in their judgments about what endorses religion, how 
alienated people feel because of endorsements of religion, and so on.45 
The Court’s opinion here is equally confident, though just on the 
other side. Here’s the majority opinion on the issue of whether the 
prayers coerce nonbelievers into participating: 
It is presumed that the reasonable observer is acquainted with this 
[historical] tradition [behind legislative prayer] and understands 
that its purposes are to lend gravity to public proceedings and to 
acknowledge the place religion holds in the lives of many private 
citizens, not to afford government an opportunity to proselytize or 
 
 41.  530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 42.  505 U.S. 577 (1992). For more examples of cases blurring the lines between private and 
state action, see Christopher C. Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the Future of the Establishment 
Clause, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1387, 1393–94 & nn.31–38 (2011). 
 43.  Justice Kennedy repeatedly says that censorship is not constitutionally required. But at 
one point, he goes further and implies that censorship is actually forbidden: “Once it invites 
prayer into the public sphere, government must permit a prayer giver to address his or her own 
God or gods as conscience dictates, unfettered by what an administrator or judge considers to 
be nonsectarian.” Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1822–23. The word “must” in that sentence jumps off 
the page, although the Court surely does not mean all that it would imply. 
 44.  See John Ramsey, Board Changes Prayer Policy, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (VA), 
July 24, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 20216299 (noting how the county used to allow clergy 
from monotheistic denominations, but now “[i]nstead of swinging open the doors to people of 
all faiths, the county instead will experiment with allowing only supervisors to open meetings 
with a prayer or moment of silence”). 
 45.  See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668–79 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment 
Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 291–95, 309–13 (1987). 
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force truant constituents into the pews. 46 
In other words, you may feel coerced by the fact that the people 
with the legal power to approve your zoning variance are watching 
you pray from thirty feet away, but you are acting unreasonably 
because no reasonable person would feel that way. Or take this one: 
Should nonbelievers choose to exit the room during a prayer they 
find distasteful, their absence will not stand out as disrespectful or 
even noteworthy. And their quiet acquiescence will not, in light of 
our traditions, be interpreted as an agreement with the words or 
ideas expressed.47 
But the Court cannot hope to control social conventions this way! 
Nonbelievers feel the way they feel; their actions will be interpreted 
as they will by the other people in the room. No one’s sentiments will 
be controlled by the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
All of these points matter, but they matter much less if Galloway’s 
import is restricted to legislative prayer. This raises the question: What 
importance does Galloway have for the larger Establishment Clause? 
Since Marsh, the shared understanding has been that whatever the 
Court does with legislative prayer has basically no relevance to other 
Establishment Clause issues.48 Galloway tries to push against that. 
Justice Kennedy says legislative prayer can no longer be treated as a 
kind of historical carve-out.49 This suggests Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence will have to be overhauled so as to square it with the 
Framers’ approval of congressional chaplaincies.50 But at the same 
time, Justice Kennedy’s opinion goes to great lengths to not address 
any topic other than legislative prayer—the Court delicately avoids 
saying anything that would create ripple effects on the Court’s 
approach to school prayer, symbols, or financial aid to religion. 
So Justice Kennedy says that Marsh cannot be treated as a carve-
out, even as he continues to treat Marsh as a carve-out. But he is right 
not to take his own advice. For whatever principle the Court ends up 
adopting as its general approach to the Establishment Clause, Marsh 
 
 46.  Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1825. 
 47.  Id. at 1827. 
 48.  See Lund, supra note 18, at 1049–50. 
 49.  Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (“Marsh must not be understood as permitting a practice 
that would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its historical foundation.”). 
 50.  Justice Kennedy says this directly at one point: “Any test the Court adopts must 
acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the critical scrutiny 
of time and political change.” Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1819. 
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by necessity will continue to be treated as a carve-out. The Court’s 
problem with legislative prayer always comes back to this: There are 
many possible principled versions of the Establishment Clause, but 
the congressional chaplaincies are inconsistent with every single one. 
Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia, for instance, conceive of the 
Establishment Clause quite narrowly. In a separate opinion in 
Galloway, they reiterate their longstanding view that the 
Establishment Clause applies only in cases of “actual legal coercion.”51 
But the congressional chaplaincies are actually legally coercive! 
Congress’s chaplaincies are paid by taxes, and everyone agrees taxes 
are coercive. The majority’s opinion recognizes the problem; its only 
response is that “the cost of [a congressional] chaplain’s salary 
imposed a vanishingly small burden on taxpayers.”52 But what does 
that mean? A small enough tax doesn’t trigger the Establishment 
Clause?53 The $500 salary for a congressional chaplain in 1789 
translates to about $13,000 in today’s dollars. There were 3 million 
people in the country in 1789, and around 300 million people today. 
So this is very rough, but a government expenditure of $1.3 million 
today would have the same order of effect as the 1789 Congress’s 
expenditure of chaplain funds. Could Virginia pass a Bill Establishing 
a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, as long as the 
government expenditure is less than a million dollars? 
This is all silly, of course; none of this will happen. But the reason 
why none of this will happen is that the Court will continue to treat 
the congressional chaplaincies as sui generis. Knowing that it cannot 
succeed, the Court will not try very hard to square legislative prayer 
with the rest of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
Galloway demonstrates that little has changed on the conservative 
side of the Court. The greater change is on the liberal side. Justice 
Kagan’s dissent eloquently advances the interrelated values of 
pluralism and inclusion in arguing against the constitutionality of the 
Town’s policy. But the most striking part of her dissent is what it does 
 
 51.  “[I]t is actual legal coercion that counts,” including “coercion of religious orthodoxy 
and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.” Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1837–38 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 52.  Id. at 1819 (majority opinion). 
 53.  On the other hand, there is Madison: “[T]he same authority which can force a citizen 
to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may 
force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever.” James Madison, 
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 82, 82 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
LUND 4.1.15-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2015  5:22 PM 
2014] LEAVING DISESTABLISHMENT TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS 57 
not say. Thirty years ago, three Justices would have declared the 
practice of legislative prayer unconstitutional tout court.54 No one on 
the current Court feels that way. Not only would the dissenters not 
overrule Marsh, Justice Kagan goes out of her way to say that she 
agrees with it.55 Sixty years ago, in a case almost no one now 
remembers, Justice Douglas made this statement: “We are a religious 
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”56 Justice 
Kagan’s dissent quotes this line approvingly—although she shrewdly 
leaves off the “institutions presuppose a Supreme Being” part of it. 57 
Of all the lines in Galloway, that was perhaps the most surprising.  It 
suggests that even the liberal Justices are mostly content with the 
present boundaries of the Establishment Clause, and are willing to 
leave further changes to the political process.  But how that will go, 
and what it will mean, are questions only the future can answer. 
 
 54.  See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795–822 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined 
by Marshall, J.); id. at 822–24 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 55.  Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1841–42 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the Court’s 
decision in Marsh . . . upholding the Nebraska Legislature’s tradition of beginning each session 
with a chaplain’s prayer.” (citation omitted)). 
 56.  Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
 57.  Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1850 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
